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INCLUSIVISM AND THE ATONEMENT
Bruce R. Reichenbach

Richard Swinburne claims that Christ's death has no efficacy unless people
appropriate it. According to religious inclusivists, God can be encountered
and his grace manifested in various ways through diverse religions. Salvation
is available for everyone, regardless of whether they have heard about Christ's
sacrifice. This poses the question whether Swinburne's view of atonement is
available to the inclusivist. T develop an inclusivist interpretation of the atonement that incorporates his four features of atonement, along with a subjective
dimension that need not include specific knowledge of Christ's sacrifice.

In what follows I will explore the apparent tension between a particular
view of the atonement that requires the subjective element of knowledge of
the sacrifice and a Christian inclusivist view of religion, where persons are
the recipients of salvific grace quite apart from their knowledge of Christ's
death on their behalf. It would appear that the inclusivist view would not
require as a subjective condition knowledge of Christ's death for experiencing the effects of the atonement, since such knowledge would be unavailable to many persons.

Swinburne's Sacrificial View of the Atonement
Richard Swinburne argues that a person who has done something wrong
is under obligation to atone for the action. 1 Atonement involves four features (though not all are required in every case): repentance, apology, reparations, and penance. "They are all contributions to removing as much of
the consequences of the past act as logically can be removed by the wrongdoer. The consequences are, first, the harm caused by and distinguishable
from the act of causing it and, second, the purposive attitude of the wrongdoer towards the victim manifested in the causing of the harm."l
In repentance, guilty persons acknowledge that they have done the
wrong act, take responsibility for it, admit that it was wrong, and affirm
that the action is contrary to their present ideals and purposes (what
Swinburne terms "distancing oneself from the act").' Repentance is necessary only in cases of subjective guilt, that is, where persons know that what
they are doing is wrong and intend to act in that fashion, or act negligently
in a morally culpable way. Objective guilt, which results from objectively
wrong actions done with neither knowledge of their wrongness, the intent
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to do wrong, nor morally culpable negligence, needs no repentance, since
the moral norms of the offender remain the same as before the wrongful act
was committed!
Swinburne's second feature of atonement is apology to the victim, which
is the public expression of repentance. Apology, he holds, is necessary for
forgiveness, for whether the guilt is objective or subjective, one has harmed
another by the wrong action. The third and fourth features are reparation
for the wrong done and penance. Reparation is an attempt to make good or
compensate the other for the harm done and losses suffered. Penance is the
something more required to show that the apology was sincere, that one
truly wants to distance oneself from the wrong actions. Though generally
necessary for atonement, reparation and penance are not required for less
serious wrongs. s
Christians teach that our sins require atonement. Swinburne understands this to mean that offenders are obliged to repent, apologize, and give
as reparation and penance something of value to God whom they have
offended. However, due to the enormity of the sin, which is against the
holiness of God, and the poverty of their own good, they lack adequate
resources to make proper reparation and penance. However, Christians
can appropriate Christ's life and death as a sacrifice, "an offering made
available to us men to offer as our reparation and penance.... It is simply a
costly penance and reparation sufficient for a merciful God to let men off
the rest."" God allows the Son to sacrifice himself so that we can apply the
merits of his innocent death to atone for our sins. Consequently, the model
of atonement on which he settles is that of a sacrifice that makes resources
available to needy sinners.
What is of interest to us is Swinburne's claim that the objective event of
Christ's sacrificial death "has no efficacy until men choose to plead it in
atonement for their sins. In so far as Christ the Son is distinct from God the
Father, the sacrifice takes place independently of us, but even here we can
hardly gain the benefit of forgiveness from it until we associate ourselves
with it.... The sinner has to use Christ's death to get forgiveness."7 But then
is this view of atonement available to the religious inclusivist? According to
the Christian inclusivist, salvation has both an objective and a subjective
dimension. The objective dimension involves Christ's death as atonement
for our sins. The subjective dimension includes, among other things, the
individual's faith and good acts. While only Christianity makes clear
Christ's atoning provision, God can be encountered and his grace manifested in various ways through diverse religions. Salvation is available for
everyone, regardless of what religion they practice or whether they have
heard about Christ's sacrifice, though it does not follow for the inclusivist
that all are saved or that all religions provide equally adequate means to
facilitate the discovery of God or spiritual development.
Hence we pose the question. For Swinburne, "if the sinner could be forgiven as a result of Christ's death, without using it to secure forgiveness, we
could be forgiven by God as a result of what has happened on Calvary
independently of our knowing about it; and that seems a suggestion very
distant from the New Testament. Forgiveness is available through 'repentance and baptism in the name of Jesus Christ,' And ... baptism is baptism
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into the death of Christ; it is using that death."B If atonement requires this
specific subjective dimension, if the person must personally appropriate the
sacrifice of Christ in order to receive God's forgiveness, can one be a
Swinburnian Christian inclusivist?

Inclusivism
Karl Rahner sees Christianity coming to persons in a historical way.
Christianity has a pre-history that incorporates among others the saved
Jews of the Old Testament. It also has a post-history, where Christianity in
time comes to people who might be followers of other religions but have
not had any significant, persuasive contact with Christianity that would
provide for them a sufficient basis for adopting an alternative religious outlook. Prior to such an encounter, their religion is lawful for them. That is, it
contains "supernatural elements arising out of the grace which is given to
men as a gratuitous gift on account of Christ."" Through practicing their
religion, these persons can partake of God's grace available uniquely
through Christ. Therefore, the lawful religion is "an institutional religion
whose 'use' by man at a certain period can be regarded on the whole as a
positive means of gaining the right relationship to God and thus for the
attaining of salvation."l0
Not all elements of lawful religions are free from error or moral
wrong. Indeed, Rahner claims that diverse religions might stress beliefs
and practices at critical variance with orthodox Christianity.ll Hence,
being lawful says little about the precise belief content but rather refers to
that religion's ability to function as a social means whereby people can
obtain salvation provided by, but apart from hearing about, Christ and
his deeds.
If this is the case, then the individual beliefs of the person regarding the
person and sacrifice of Christ matter not at all. For Rahner the objective
dimension - the salvific act of Christ and God's intervention to confer the
grace secured by Christ - remains central and operative. Without this, neither Christians nor nonchristians are saved. But the subjective element
regarding belief in Christ is missing. Rahner appears to place greater
emphasis on the participation of believers in their social religion than on
holding any given religious belief.
One can find a similar view in C.S. Lewis. At the end of The Last Battle
Emeth finds it puzzling that he should be accepted into Asian's kingdom
without even having recognized AsIan. Indeed, he has served Tash all his
life. AsIan comments, "I take to me the services which thou hast done to
[Tash], for I and he are of such different kinds that no service which is vile
can be done to me, and none which is not vile can be done to him.
Therefore if any man swear by Tash and keep his oath for the oath's sake, it
is by me that he has truly sworn, though he know it not."12 One can be reconciled with God quite apart from the subjective element of appropriating
or believing in the sacrifice of Christ.
The Christian inclusivist affirms two distinct elements. On the one
hand, the voluntary sacrifice of God's Son provides the necessary, objective
component of atonement. This act, truly made known in Christianity,
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makes available grace that can be used for the reparation and penance that
are due God because of the sins we have committed against him. On the
other hand, the subjective component is indefinite. Lewis puts constraints
on the subjective component, suggesting a universal moral law, known to
all, that delineates acts that can be done only to a holy God and not to any
demonic being. Similarly, Clark Pinnock, who has a more pessimistic view
of the efficacy of other religions, places emphasis on believers' faith and
moral life, on whether they fear God and pursue righteousness in their
behavior.13 Rahner seems unwilling to go quite that far, suggesting that
other religions need not be morally perfect. It is rather that on the whole
these other religions provide for their believers the locus for supernatural
action on their behalf.
It is clear that the subjective and objective components will not, indeed,
cannot, correspond in the case of those religions where Christianity has not
made a historical presence. Then what is it that a nonchristian must believe
about Christ's sacrifice? A little bit? This is impossible because of the historical restrictions. None? Then the subjective component can and often
will have a different intentional object than Christ's sacrifice.

Other Theories of Atonement
It should not be thought that the other atonement theories fare better on
this score. The moral influence theory, which sees in the atonement Christ
setting the example for us, suffers from the same defect. Christ might be a
model for those who are aware of him but serves no function for those who
have not heard about him or his suffering. The Abelardian could hold that
Christ's death was only one place where the demonstration of supreme
ideals occurred. But then the centrality and uniqueness of Chrisit's death as
an atoning event is lost; the Buddha or Confucius can likewise serve as a
moral example.
According to the governmental theory, Christ's death takes the place
of our deserved punishment. His death was not punishment, for one
person cannot be punished for another. Rather, it stands as a lesson that
God's justice cannot be thwarted, that sin is tied up with guill:, which in
turn deserves punishment. But the Grotian theory too has the required
subjective element. Christ's death, though not itself a punishment, acts
as a deterrent, warning us about God's hatred of sin, about the need for
punishment, and the requirement that we turn from our sin. Thus, the
atonement will have its full effect only insofar as it is known and appropriated by us, bringing about repentance and conversion.
Some theories fare better, but that is because they lack the subjective condition as a necessary condition. The classical ransom theory, for example,
does not require that we play an active role in the transaction. Christ's
death provides adequate payment to ransom us from Satan. We are passive
recipients. The atonement can go on without our knowledge of or participation in the event. But Swinburne's theory would be telling against such
strictly objectivist views.
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Repentance and Penance
Let us begin to answer the question whether one needs to know Christ's
atoning act by returning to Swinburne's four features of atonement.
Swinburne's first condition for atonement is repentance. To truly atone for
their sins, persons must express sincere sorrow for their actions. This component of atonement is possible for persons regardless of the institutional
religion of which they are a part. Individuals of all faiths (or none at all) can
express their sorrow for their evil deeds, for the harm they have caused others, and for their own lack of moral virtue, and can seek to mend their ways
and character.
The fourth condition - penance - likewise is manageable under an
inclusivist scheme. Swinburne suggests the purpose of the penance is to
perform some act costly to oneself in order to show the sincerity of one's
repentance. To show oneself sincere we need to "give what we cannot too
easily afford."14 But penance does not require an infinite payment or a cost
beyond what we can afford, for the whole point of it is to show our sincerity
in repentance. Neither need it require knowledge of Christ's act of atonement. The notion of penance is found in the world religions, expressed in
actions such as abstinence, taking of vows, making a pilgrimage, bathing in
a sacred river, and flagellation.

Grievousness of Sin
The third condition - reparation or what Anselm terms satisfaction - is
more problematic for the Christian inclusivist. First, are reparations necessary? Swinburne holds that reparations are not necessary in instances of
less serious offenses. Is sin to be taken seriously? Anselm believes sin is
serious, for in it we have robbed God of his honor.15 How serious is sin?
Anselm sees sin as "so grievous, ... no loss will compare with it."16
Consequently, we cannot restore what we have taken from God.
But why is it so serious that we cannot make reparations for our sin from
our own resources? One argument for its seriousness is that we have
sinned against a being whose very nature is to be morally perfect and hence
abhorrent of evil. That is, the fact that we have sinned against the Holy One
exacerbates its seriousness. But one might wonder whether this feature is
relevant to the determination of the reparations we owe. Reparations vary
according to the seriousness of the crime; grand larceny requires greater
reparation than petty theft, rape than assault. But will the reparations vary
depending on the moral character of the person we wrong? It would seem
not. To wrong or do evil to someone is to violate his or her personhood. It
is to treat persons as only means to some other good or end and not as
moral ends intrinsically valuable in themselves. But as Kant argued, we
have a duty to treat people as ends or valuable in themselves and not merely as means. Further, from the Christian perspective we are all made in
God's image and hence equally valued by God. God does not love one person, qua person, more than another. Consequently, the degree of innocence
of the offended is irrelevant to determining the seriousness of the sin. No
one is to be unjustly harmed or wronged, so that it is no less wrong to steal
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a car from an immoral executive than from a moral one. What one owes in
reparation is determined not by the value of the person wronged but by
what one steals and the harm that results from the theft. If what one steals
is the same and the consequences for the person remain the same, all else
being equal, the reparations owed to each will be the same. Hence, the fact
that one has sinned against the Holy One should not make a difference in
the reparations owed. A violation against other persons would be equally
serious. Accordingly, what matters in calculating reparation is the degree
of our offense.
One might object that while personal status does not matter when
applied to human persons, God differs in kind from humans, such that an
offense against God is more serious than an offense against a human, all
else being equal. l7 But what is there about the status of God - his difference in kind - that would support this? Swinburne bases his view of the
seriousness of sin on the fact that God is both our cause and our end. We
are totally dependent on God, so that to offend God is, as it were, to offend
our parents by refusing to use our talents in ways that further our lives.
Similarly, if God made us to have friendship with him, then sin is a way of
rejecting that friendship, which is a serious affront to God. lH But appeals to
particular qualities, such as being an originating and sustaining causal
power and friendship, like appeals to longevity and moral goodness, do not
justify this conclusion, for differential possession of these same qualities
would not justify differential treatment of humans. It is no less wrong to
strike or murder a stranger than to do the same to one's parents or a friend,
for in both cases one is not treating them as intrinsically valuable.'" One
could appeal to the mere fact that God is God to justify differential judgments, but as Jonathan Kvanvig points out, such an appeal begs the question by failing to provide principled grounds for the claim that the status of
the one sinned against matters. 20
One might also reply that sinning against God is more serious because of
God's relation to the moral law. One might reasonably hold that it is more
wrong to kill a police officer or judge than an ordinary citizen, not because
these persons are more valuable or praiseworthy, but because the police
officer or judge stands in relation to the law executively or judicially, so that
an attack against such a person extends beyond the person to the very law
the person in such a position represents. Similarly, since God is connected
to the moral law legislatively, executively, or judicially, in sinning against
God one is not merely wronging God but attacking the moral law itself. It
is not merely rejecting God but also the moral law that provides the foundation for human social interaction and moral accountability.
This argument is persuasive. But what it establishes is that sinning
against God is a very serious matter, not that every case is infinitely serious.
In certain circumstances sin might be tantamount to attacking the moral law
itself, insofar as the moral law is grounded in the nature of God. Yet it
seems that one cannot separate the seriousness of the sin from the nature of
the sin itself, so that sin's seriousness can be a function of two elements: the
sin committed and, at times, the one sinned against (when that person represents something more). Hence, there might well be degrees of sin, so that
some is more serious than others, thereby warranting different reparations.'!
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Forgiveness and Reparation
Let us grant that sin against God is serious business, in fact, so great that
in general it merits great reparation. The second question that arises is
whether it would be enough for God to accept the reparations we can offer
and forgive us nonetheless, without requiring something beyond our
means.
Swinburne concedes that though it is within the victim's rights to ask for
full reparation, it is not necessary that the victim demand reparation.
Should victims not ask for reparation they would not be committing a
moral wrong. In fact, for the victim to dismiss the claim to reparations
might be a supererogatory action. Similarly with God. If indeed God possesses all, then one might think it niggling of God to demand reparations
from us for our sins. God, it would seem, could forgive without such
demands, for God does not need what little we can give in return.
Anselm replies that to forgive without compensation or punishment is
not right. In particular, it leads to indifference between the guilty and not
guilty. Further, sin would not affect the outcome, for whether we are sinners or not, happiness would be our final state.22 God cannot simply forgive
without violating his justice.
Furthermore, Anselm continues, unless God gets compensation, God
will not be just to himself, for he wrongly will have allowed his honor to be
taken away and not restored. 23 Finally, should there be no reparation it
would show that God is deficient in his management of the universe, which
would be contrary to his wisdom and power. 2•
Swinburne takes a more mediating position, arguing that one can forgive
without reparation. However, following Anselm, he notes that forgiveness
without reparations can be a sign in serious cases, especially to the culprit,
that the victim did not take seriously the evil done to him or her. It "trivializes human life ... and human relationships."2s And surely, God wants us to
take sin seriously, in virtue not only of God's holiness but also of God's concern for our moral development. Hence, it seems right that God require
reparations for sins committed, for in doing so God sets an example of his
hatred of sin and gets us to take seriously the sins we commit. In this
respect the moral influence theory of the atonement conveys an important
insight.
But need God exact so great a reparation, given our poverty and his riches? If the purpose of reparation is to communicate to us God's hatred of sin
and to get us to forsake sinful ways, the reparations demanded must be
costly. But do they require not only the meritorious action of a sinless person but the death of God's Son? It would seem that less drastic measures
could be taken to satisfy this demand.
Anselm replies that the "satisfaction should be proportionate to guilt.
Otherwise sin would remain in a manner exempt from control."26 And sin
against the holy God, as we have noted, is so grievous that no human could
possibly provide adequate reparations. Anselm might be correct were only
justice taken into account. But the redemptive process includes both justice
and mercy. Thus, though from a strictly judicial perspective one might
expect that the reparations would match the loss, God might invoke other
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considerations to redress this imbalance.
Swinburne denies the necessity of proportionality. But whether or not
one holds to parity, we cannot make complete or adequate reparation
because of our spiritual poverty. We are fallen, sinfuL>' More than this,
Anselm argues, we have nothing left to satisfy God's honor, since all that
we already have we owe to him as our creator. We have nothing extra that
could be used to satisfy the claims against US.28
Here God the Father intervenes through the Son's voluntary sacrifice.
Since due to our sinfulness we lack the resources to make adequate amends
for our action, God the Father sends his Son to supply our deficiency. Such
a sacrifice might be appropriate, but is it necessary? Could not God forgive
based simply upon the reparations that we can and do offer?
The key here has to do with the purity of the reparations made.
Swinburne holds that "appropriate reparation and penance would be
made by a perfect human life, given away through being lived perfectly."29 The biblical motif of sacrifice always required a perfect animal,
without blemish. The same theme is reiterated in the sacrifice of Christ,
who the New Testament writers claim was without sin. So one might say
that it is not illogical or unreasonable for God to demand such reparations, since we are the ones who sinned in the first place. At the same
time it might be difficult to argue that such expectations are necessary,
even if God is holy or morally perfect. 30

Reparations and Inclusivism
This discussion makes plain the relevance of the objective aspect of the
atonement account. What remains to be shown is that individual sinners
must consciously apply Christ's provision of reparations to their account.
As we have seen, Christian inclusivists must argue that the merits of
Christ's sacrifice can be applied to persons regardless of their ignorance of
Christ's sacrifice or their failure to invoke it as a sufficient reparation for
their own sins. That is, they have to show somehow that one might make
amends in ignorance of what is truly required or what is provided for the
reparation.
Interestingly enough, Swinburne provides a response to the subjectivist
problem. He sees sin as occasioning a debt. Though ordinarily the sinner
pays this debt, Swinburne holds that it is possible for the descendants of the
debtor to satisfy the debt. 31 By granting this, Swinburne allows reparations
to be made by another, even when the debtor is dead and unaware of the
reparations. This preserves the recognition of the seriousness of the sin,
since the reparations are made in full, though the application of the subjective element here is assigned to others. Within the theological atonement
context, Christ supplies the reparations on behalf of the debtors. As the
descendants can payoff the debt of their progenitor, so Christ can payoff
our debt, since we are united together with him in his death.
Thus it would appear that on Swinburne's own position the payment of
reparations need not be made by the debtor him or herself but can be
accomplished by others apart from the subjective condition of the debtor's
knowledge. In the case of the atonement, Christ, who knows the purpose of
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his death as the fulfillment of the mission assigned to him by the Father,
voluntarily pays the reparations, with or without our knowledge.

Apology and Pardon
This leaves us with Swinburne's second condition: apology or request
for a pardon. On the one hand, this does not seem problematic in that
offenders from any religion can apologize sincerely to those whom they
have wronged. This is compatible with a Christian perspective that sees the
Holy Spirit working in people's lives, bringing them by grace to repentance.
But since the act is a sin, the offender has not only offended another
human person, he or she also has wronged Cod. Hence, the offender owes
God an apology as well. But if offenders do not believe in God or they practice a religion that does not hold such beliefs, such an apology would not be
culturally or religiously relevant to them. The broad inclusivist would
either have to exclude practitioners of nontheistic religions from participating in atonement or find an alternative way of understanding apology.
How are those who have never heard of the sacrifice of Christ or who do
not believe in God to request a pardon from God based on Christ's work?
Two possibilities exist. One can be developed from a suggestion by
Anselm. He writes that the atonement applies not only to Christ's contemporaries but also to others. He gives the example of a great king who
wished, because of a great service, to pardon all those who had rebelled
against him. But not all can make it on the appointed day. Accordingly, the
king announces that any who "acknowledge that [they] wished to obtain
pardon by the work that day accomplished, and subscribe to the condition
there laid down, should be freed from all past guilt."32 One might develop
this to suggest, as Swinburne does,'3 that after their death God informs
nonchristians of good will about the salvific death of Christ and makes
available to them for their acceptance the grace that results from Christ's
death. This solution requires that individuals live again after their death
and at that time be given a chance to apologize and request God's forgiveness.
Let us attempt a second response that does not require this presupposition. Why does Swinburne require apology? His answer is that it is necessary for forgiveness. But cannot the offended forgive those who by repenting have expressed deep sorrow for their actions, even if they have not
apologized to the offended? That someone is sorry for his or her action but
has not apologized to the offended is not very plausible if the offender
knows whom and how he or she has offended. But it is more plausible in
certain other types of cases, for example, where offenders are ignorant of
whom they have offended or have no way of contacting those whom they
offended. Here it could be sufficient for the offended simply to know that
the offender sincerely repents of the offense and has apologized to those
whom he or she thought was offended.
Swinburne notes that in apology the offender "assures the victim that he
recognizes its wrongness and that he purposes to amend."34 Although the
person offended has not him or herself received a direct apology, direct
apology does not seem always necessary to provide to the victim the neces-
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sary assurance of the wrongdoer's sorrow and change of life. In the kind of
unusual circumstance we are considering the offended could be reasonably
assured by noting the wrongdoers' contrition for the act, their apology to
those the offender believes were offended, and their public change of
behavior. Forgiveness in such cases would not exemplify cheap grace but is
an appropriate response to the offender's sincere repentance.
Forgiveness would not restore the conscious relation between the offender and God, but in the type of case under consideration, the individuals did
not have such a relation in the first place, since they did not acknowledge
God's existence. Apologies that restore conscious relations would be direct.
So far we have assumed that the phenomena in other religions must parallel Swinburne's four subjective criteria, including that the person normally
must actually apologize in so many words to the offended. But is this
assumption justified? Could not the condition of apology be met in ways
that are not strictly parallel? For example, one might perform an action that
would be functionally equivalent to the expression of apology though not
itself an apology. It would seem that definite language or specific behavior
is not always necessary to express a particular subjective desire. After doing
some wrong, a child, for example, might climb into a parent's lap and snuggle, an action the parent can interpret as an apology, though the child has no
such concept. Similarly, those who do not know about the death of Christ or
the reparation won thereby, or who are not party to the Swinburnian analysis that atonement requires among other conditions apology, might perform
a variety of acts, such as meditation, purification, or acts specified in the
Eight-Fold Path directed toward moral rectification. As the parent must discern the true wishes of the child without relying on specific deeds or even
correct language, so the heavenly Parent discerns the attitudes and desires of
the penitents and can make available Christ's grace on their behalf, treating
these acts as somehow functionally equivalent to apology. By actions that
are not point by point comparable to the Swinburnian elements but that contextually reflect the moral seriousness with which they understand what
they have done and express their regret and desire for moral rectification,
penitents can fulfill the subjective dimension.

Conclusion
In conclusion, one can appropriate something subjectively without
knowing how it is achieved objectively. We have numerous examples of
this. Suppose I have no idea how the stock market works, what transactions must be made to consummate a stock trade, or who carries out the
trade. I simply request a broker to obtain some stock for me. Both objective
and subjective elements apply. The broker purchases the stock for me and
objectively it is mine. Subjectively, I accept what he has done (and objectively send him the money). But my ownership of the stock does not
depend on my knowledge of any of the transactions or how the system
works.
Similarly, Christian inclusivists can include the subjective element of
appropriation of Christ's sacrifice. Within the context of their nonchristian
religions believers might express a genuine repentance for sin, apologize to
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the offended and possibly to God, and desire to make amends (hence the
presence of sacrifice as a central part of many religious rituals). The
Swinburnian inclusivist will realize that this is coupled with theological
inadequacy, perhaps even falsity, because of the nonchristian's ignorance of
Christ. Yet God truly discerns the hearts of those who, perhaps unknowingly, worship him, for as Lewis says through AsIan, the good can only be
done in the name of God and the evil in that which stands opposed to God.
Inclusivists also realize that the religions in which nonchristians participate
contextualize belief formulations and practices in ways that might provide
alternative structures to satisfy the above four factors. Though couched in
concepts or language unfamiliar to Christians, they might be functionally
equivalent to atonement concepts, so that God can apply Christ's sacrifice to
those who engage in such practices. By their own faith and practice
nonchristians thus express the belief that salvation or liberation is possible,
though they do not know or have a mistaken notion of the exact circumstances whereby the merits of Christ's death are made available.'5
This preserves the subjective component of the atonement, while building on the objective component. The subjective element is present in appropriate, contextualized acts, though the degree of knowledge and the linguistic expression falls short of Swinburne's requirement that people plead precisely Christ's act. Yet this weakened sense of subjective invocation is consistent with the biblical story that appropriates Christ's atonement even to
those who lived before and were ignorant of the objective act.
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